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We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with an heterogeneous bank-
ing sector. We introduce endogenous default probabilities for both ﬁrms and banks, and
allow for bank regulation and liquidity injection into the interbank market. Our aim is to
understand the interactions between the banking sector and the rest of the economy, as well
as the importance of supervisory and monetary authorities to restore ﬁnancial stability. The
model is calibrated against real US data and used for simulations. We show that Basel reg-
ulation reduces the steady state but improves the resilience of the economy to shocks, and
that moving from Basel I to Basel II is procyclical. We also show that liquidity injections
relieve ﬁnancial instability but have ambiguous effects on output ﬂuctuations.
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In neoclassical models, the capital market is perfectly competitive and investment is simply
determined by the marginal cost of capital. More fundamentally, in these models, the capital
market is not distorted by taxes, transaction or bankruptcy costs, imperfect information or any
other friction which limits access to credit, so the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem holds
meaning that ﬁnancial and credit market conditions become irrelevant and cannot affect real
economic outcomes. However, credit market imperfections and ﬁnancial agents’ behavior are
often considered a crucial contributing factor to the severity of crises, for instance during the
Great Depression or more recently the subprime crises and associated ﬁnancial turmoil. This
central role of the credit market may in turn explain why banking remains so heavily regulated
despite the signiﬁcant deregulation in recent decades in many other industries. This may also
explain why central banks react so rapidly to ﬁnancial crises, despite the risk of creating moral
hazard.
The main objective of this paper is to build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with imperfections in the credit market, such that the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem
no longer holds. More precisely, following Goodhart et al. (2006), we develop an endogenous
and heterogeneous banking sector, and allow for bank regulation and liquidity injections. We
embed this banking sector representation in an otherwise standard real business cycle model
(hereafter RBC, see King and Rebelo (1999) for an extensive exposition). We start from the
RBC model because it is now widely accepted as a benchmark in the literature. Moreover, in
the limiting case of no default rates and no supervisory and monetary authorities, our model
generates results similar to those of the RBC model. We then develop a plausible calibration
and use our model to understand the interactions between the banking sector and the rest of
the economy, as well as the role of supervisory and monetary authorities in restoring ﬁnancial
stability.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Cooley et al. (2004), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) or Iacovello (2005) introduce credit market frictions (asymmetry of information and
agency costs, limited contract enforceability, collateral constraints,...) in dynamic general equi-
librium models and show that frictions act as a ﬁnancial accelerator. These models only focus
on the demand side of the credit market and banks are limited to act as intermediaries between
households (lenders) and ﬁrms (borrowers). Meh and Moran (2004) argue that banks them-
selves are also subject to frictions in raising loanable funds and show that the supply side of
the credit market (bank balance sheet) also contributes to shock propagation. However, their
capital-asset ratio is market-determined rather than originating from regulatory requirements.
Markovic (2006) develops a closely related model in which banks must raise capital reserves
(or reduce their loan supply) to fulﬁll regulatory requirements. Results suggest that the bank
2capital channel contributes signiﬁcantly to the monetary transmission mechanism, along with
the corporate balance sheet channel. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Christiano et al.
(2007) formulate quantitative models to assess the relevance of a detailed banking sector (and
hence the importance of distinguishing among the various short term interest rates) for mon-
etary policy. Gerali et al. (2008) augment these papers by introducing imperfect competition
among banks.1
All the papers mentioned above use homogeneous banks and the interbank market either col-
lapses or amounts to a connection with the central bank. But as mentioned in Goodhart et al.
(2006), ignoring bank heterogeneity and the existence of a true interbank market obscure all the
relationships between banks which interest supervisory authorities and central banks. More-
over, most papers limit bank choices to collecting deposits and supplying loans, forgetting
possibilities as other balance sheet choices or default. Goodhart et al. (2005) develop a model
including an heterogeneous banking sector with an explicit interbank market, optimal balance
sheet choices and endogenous default rates. Since the main focus of their paper is ﬁnancial
fragility, a ﬁnancial regulator imposes a range of penalties in case of default or non respect of
capital adequacy ratio. A central bank is also included on the interbank market. However, if
the “core” banking sector is extensively developed and micro-founded, the “periphery” agents
are modelled through reduced form equations. In addition, this is only a 2-period model which
cannot track dynamic effects of shocks or policies.2
Our model includes one agent that borrows (representative ﬁrm) and one that lends (represen-
tative household), as well as a banking market composed of two banks (a net lender and a net
borrower on the interbank market) with endogenous balance sheet decisions. We assume that
agents (ﬁrms and banks) may default on their ﬁnancial obligations, subject to default costs,
and these defaults act as ﬁnancial accelerators. Our model is fully microfounded in the sense
that all agents maximize proﬁts or utility under constraints. Moreover, we have capital regu-
lation rules set by a supervisory authority and we allow for monetary policy through liquidity
injections into the interbank market. We therefore have a banking sector representation close
to Goodhart et al. (2005), but we embed it in a fully micro-founded dynamic (intertemporal)
stochastic general equilibrium model. As underlined in Borio and Zhu (2007), this is the only
framework in which dynamic interactions between agents and policy effects can be properly
assessed.
We use US data on interest rates, default rates, bank balance sheet and production to calibrate
the model. We introduce a productivity shock (TFP shock) and compare our simulation results
1This literature review is far from being exhaustive and we concentrate on dynamic general equilibrium models.
For an extended survey, see for instance VanHoose (2008).
2Decisions under uncertainty (2 possible states) are taken in period 1. In period 2 the state of the world is
revealed and contracts are settled.
3to US data. We show that the productivity shock alone does not allow to reproduce all US
stylized facts (for instance the procyclicality of bank proﬁts) but adding a - positively corre-
lated - market book shock improves the results. We also show that imposing a Basel regulation
(minimum capital ratio) reduces the steady state but improves the resilience of the economy to
shocks, and that moving from Basel I to Basel II (more risk-sensitive requirements) is procycli-
cal. These effects are however quantitatively weak because mitigated by the buffer banks hold
on top of the required minimum capital. We then illustrate the subprime crisis by replacing
the productivity shock by a negative market book shock. Wee see that a banking shock may
have dramatic impacts on the rest of the economy and that central bank reaction (liquidity in-
jections) strongly reduces the negative effects on GDP at impact but creates distortions in the
medium-run. However, liquidity injections have unambiguous and positive effects on ﬁnancial
stability.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 describes the calibration. Section 4 compares our
numerical simulations with US data and explains the role of endogenous defaults and the Basel
regulation. Section 5 looks at the effect of a market book shock. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We depart from the standard RBC model with a perfectly competitive capital (or credit) market
between households/lenders and ﬁrms/borrowers by introducing a banking sector. More pre-
cisely, we assume that households deposit savings with a bank and that ﬁrms borrow capital
from a bank. In this setup, bank deposits (from households) may differ from bank loans (to
ﬁrms) and the interest rate on deposits (lending rate) may differ from the interest rate on loans
(borrowing rate) generating an interest rate spread.
A second departure from the standard model is the introduction of an interbank market: banks
receiving deposits from households (excess liquidity) are different from banks supplying loans
to ﬁrms (liquidity shortage) and equilibrium is restored through the interbank market.3 The
interbank interest rate is free to move (no central bank intervention) or alternatively, the cen-
tral bank may inject or remove liquidity to inﬂuence the interbank rate. Again, the interbank
interest rate may differ from both the lending rate and the borrowing rate.
We also introduce endogenous probabilities of default for ﬁrms and borrowing banks. In other
words, a ﬁrm default may lead to a bank default on the interbank market. It is worth noting
that we do not have a default possibility for the lending banks. We believe this is a fair rep-
3In the subsequent analysis, we call “borrowing banks” those who borrow on the interbank market and lend to
ﬁrms, and “lending banks” those who lend on the interbank market and collect deposits from households. Alter-
natively, we could argue we have two types of specialized banks: deposit banks collecting deposits and merchant
banks lending to ﬁrms.
4resentation of reality because a deposit guarantee scheme exists in all OECD countries. Our
representation therefore implies that banks take risks (uncertain net return on investment) in-
stead of households (net investment return always perfectly known). The fact that banks have
different mechanisms (own funds commitment, insurance fund, portfolio diversiﬁcation,...) to
protect themselves against these risks justiﬁes their role as ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Finally, we have a supervisory authority, ﬁxing own fund requirements for banks. These re-
quirements may be independent from the business cycle (Basel I, based on asset type) or risk-
sensitive (Basel II, based on asset type and asset quality). We therefore have six agents in our
model: ﬁrms, borrowing banks, lending banks, households, a supervisory authority and a cen-
tral bank. The relationships between these six agents are summarized in Figure 1. Without
defaults and hence without supervision, the distinction between the three interest rates would
become irrelevant and our model would collapse into a standard RBC one.
2.1 Firms
Risk-neutral ﬁrms choose employment, new borrowing and repayment rate on past borrowing
from proﬁt maximization.4 As in Shubik and Wilson (1977), Dubey et al. (2005) or Elul (2008),
defaulters are not excluded from the market but bear costs. Costs are both non pecuniary (disu-
tility or “social stigma”: reputation losses, pangs of conscience; represented by the parameter
df) and pecuniary (higher search costs to obtain new loans because of the bad reputation; rep-


































˜ βt+s = βs UCt+s
UCt
. (4)
Equation (2) is the law of motion for capital. Capital Kt depreciates at a rate τ and ﬁrms borrow
Lb
t at a price 1/(1 + rb
t) to reﬁll their capital stock.5 Equation (3) deﬁnes proﬁt π
f
t . The ﬁrms
4Risk-neutrality for ﬁrms is a usual assumption in the RBC literature.
5The interest rate is predetermined meaning it is ﬁxed (contract between ﬁrms and banks) at the borrowing time
t and not at the repayment time t + 1. We think this is a plausible representation of reality. Moreover, without pre-
determination, the endogenous default choice would be irrelevant because it would be totally offset by an interest
rate increase. In reality, ﬁrms may also ﬁnance investment with own funds or through direct access to ﬁnancial
markets, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. We assume ﬁrms ﬁnance investment with bank credit.
5produce goods using capital and labor Nt as input, and ǫt is a total factor productivity shock.
They pay a wage wt to workers and reimburse their previous period borrowing Lb
t−1. They
choose what proportion αt of their previous borrowing they want to repay, knowing that they
will have to pay tomorrow a quadratic search cost on any defaulted amount (and also bear a
disutility). Firms are ultimately owned by households and their discount factor is therefore
given by equation (4), where UCt represents the marginal utility of consumption and β the
discount factor.
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.2 Banks borrowing from the interbank market (merchant banks)
Risk-averse merchant banks choose fund allocation (loans Lb
t to ﬁrms, market book Bb
t, bor-
rowing Dbd
t from the interbank market and own funds Fb
t ) and their repayment rate on past
borrowing to maximize proﬁts.6 As for ﬁrms, defaulters are not excluded but have both disu-
tility and pecuniary costs.7 We follow Goodhart et al. (2005) by assuming a positive utility dFb
for the buffer of own funds Fb
t above the minimum capital requirement imposed by the ﬁnan-
cial supervisory authority which ﬁxes the coverage ratio of risky assets k, together with ¯ ωt and
˜ ω the respective weights on loans and on the market book. In addition, ¯ ωt may vary over time,
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t−2 + (1+ ρt)Bb
t−1 − Bb
t, (7)
with ζb, ξb and υb ∈ [0,1]. Equation (6) states that own funds are increased each period by the
share υb of proﬁts that are not redistributed to the households-shareholders. Furthermore, a
6See for instance Goodhart et al. (2005) for a similar risk-aversion assumption. Risk-neutral banks imply that
each market is isolated whereas risk aversion affects the relationships between markets (i.e. the relationships be-
tween interest rates) through marginal utility of proﬁt terms.
7See previous subsection for a justiﬁcation. dδ represents the disutility cost and ωb the pecuniary cost.
8In practice, the regulator sets a minimum capital requirement and penalties are paid in case of violation. Since
we want to rule out a corner solution in our model, we simply assume that banks want to keep a buffer above the
required minimum in order to avoid penalties. This buffer assumption does not seem unrealistic and is found in
data (see section 3). As underlined in Borio and Zhu (2007), crossing the capital threshold is extremely costly for
a bank (restrictive supervisory actions, market reaction, reputation losses) and would be regarded as the “kiss of
death”.
6small ﬁxed proportion ξb of the own funds are put in an insurance fund managed by a pub-
lic authority. Equation (7) deﬁnes the period proﬁt. The bank borrows Dbd
t on the interbank
market at a price 1/(1 + it). It chooses the fraction δt of past borrowing it wants to pay back,
knowing that it will have to pay tomorrow a quadratic search cost on her defaulted amount.
Because of the existence of the insurance fund, the bank is able to recover a fraction ζb of the
ﬁrms’ defaulted amount. The last terms (1 + ρt)Bb
t−1 − Bb
t on the right-hand side represent
the market book net situation (income less investment), where 1 + ρt is the gross return. We
assume an exogenous market book volume Bb
t = ¯ Bb
t and the net return simpliﬁes into ρt ¯ Bb.
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.3 Banks lending to the interbank market (deposit banks)
Risk-averse deposit banks choose fund allocation (loans Dbs
t to the interbank market, market
book Bl
t, deposits Dl
t from households and own funds Fl
t) from proﬁt maximization. As the
merchant banks, they derive utility dFl from the buffer of own funds above the capital require-
ment imposed by the supervisory authority. The latter ﬁxes the coverage ratio of risky assets
k, as well as ¯ ¯ ω and ˜ ω, the weights associated respectively to interbank loans and market book.
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t−2 + (1+ ρt)Bl
t−1 − Bl
t, (10)
with ζl, ξl and υl ∈ [0,1]. Equation (9) displays the own funds dynamic: own funds Fl
t are
increased each period by the share υl of proﬁts that are not redistributed to the households-
shareholders. Furthermore, a small ﬁxed proportion ξl of the own funds are put in an insurance
fund managed by a public authority. Equation (10) deﬁnes the bank’s proﬁt πl
t. It pays a net
return rl
t/(1 + rl
t) on deposits from households and receives a gross return it/(1 + it) from
loans on the interbank market, the net return varying along with the merchant banks default
rate (1−δt). Note that a fraction ζl of the defaulted amount (by the defaulting merchant banks)
is paid back to the deposit banks from the insurance fund managed by the public authority. We
assume that the lending banks never default, that is they always repay 100% of deposits. The
last terms (1 + ρt)Bl
t−1 − Bl
t on the right-hand side represent the market book net situation
(income less investment). We assume an exogenous market book volume Bl
t = ¯ Bl
t and the net
return simpliﬁes into ρt ¯ Bl.
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
72.4 Households
As in the standard RBC literature, we assume risk-averse households maximizing the utility of
consumption Ct and leisure 1− Nt. We also impose a target in deposits (households do not like
deposits differing from their long run optimal level) through a quadratic disutility term.9 The



























= wtNt + Dl
t−1 + π
f
t + (1− υb)πb
t + (1− υl)πl
t. (12)
The ﬁrst order conditions are developed in Appendix A.
2.5 Central bank
In the long run, we assume equilibrium in the interbank market, that is Dbd = Dbs. However,





The liquidity operation Mt follows a simpliﬁed McCallum (1994) rule:
Mt = ν (it − ¯ i), (14)
with ν ≥ 0, such that Mt increases (resp. decreases) when the interbank rate is higher (resp.
lower) than the desired value ¯ i.10 If ν = 0, there is no central bank intervention and the inter-
bank interest rate clears the interbank market.11
9 We introduce the convex disutility term for technical reasons. If χ = 0, both equations (A9) and (A12) give
the steady state for rl
t, leaving Dl
t undetermined (singular matrix). By imposing χ > 0, we force equation (A12)
to determine the steady state of Dl
t. Note that in our calibration, χ is kept close to zero to only marginally affect
the dynamic properties of the model. Alternatively, we could introduce a bank production function and assume
that Dl
t/(1 + rl
t) deposits only produce (Dl
t/(1 + rl
t))λ assets. As long as λ  = 1, this would allow equation (A9) to
determine Dl
t at the steady state.
10Since Mt = 0 in the long run, ¯ i must be equal to the equilibrium value of the interbank rate, i.e. ¯ i = i.
11In our model, because of the long run equilibrium in the interbank market, there is no distinction between
central bank money and private bank money. In other words, interest and default rates apply to both types of
funds. Alternatively, we could assume long run disequilibrium in the interbank market (for instance demand
from borrowing ﬁrms structurally higher than supply from lending ﬁrms). In this case the central bank should
permanently supply money Mt > 0 and we could distinguish between private bank funds and central bank funds.
This alternative route would not change our results.
82.6 Supervisory authority
The supervisory authority ﬁxes the capital requirement ratio k and the weights ¯ ωt, ¯ ¯ ω and ˜ ω
associated with the different kinds of risky assets. We assume that under Basel I regulations,
all weights are constant and in particular ¯ ωt = ¯ ω. Basel II regulations offer more sophisticated
and informative measures of risks and capital adequacy. In particular, in our model, we assume
that the credit weight associated to loans to ﬁrms is risk-sensitive. If the expectations of ﬁrm
default increase, the associated weight also increases:






with η > 0.12
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model on average historical real quarterly US data (from 1985Q1 to 2008Q2).13
The calibration of the banking sector (section 3.1) is mainly based on balance sheet and macro-
ﬁnancial data whereas we build the calibration of the real sector (ﬁrms and households, sec-
tion 3.2) from national account data. The summary of the calibration as well as the implied
values for variables are given in Tables 1 and 2. We also provide in Appendix B further empir-
ical evidence on the close relationship between the banking and the real sector activities.
3.1 Banking sector
To match the data, we set the steady state values for the three quarterly real interest rates at
rb = 1.6% (borrowing rate), i = 0.7% (interbank rate) and rl = 0.35% (deposit rate), implying
a discount factor of β = 1/(1 + rl). The average quarterly real return of the Dow Jones from
1985Q1 to 2008Q2 is about 2.2% but we can expect that banks also have higher-yield securities.
In our model we therefore assume that the market book offers a real return ρ = 3%. Using the
Z-score method (probability that own funds are not sufﬁcient to absorb losses, see Appendix C
for details), we ﬁnd that the quarterly probability of default for banks is 0.1%. This is obviously
low but can be explained because the Z-score is computed from aggregate data (one single
representative US bank). Computing Z-scores from individual bank data and then aggregat-
ing the different results would probably increase the value. Alternatively, we deﬁne the bank
default rate by the ratio of bankruptcies to banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
provides data on the number of bank failures and the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data
on the number of closings in the ﬁnancial sector. This gives respectively 1% and 4% (but this
12We could similarly introduce Basel II regulations on interbank loans with ¯ ¯ ωt = ¯ ¯ ωEt [(δ/δt+1)η].
13Some of the data we use are only available since 1985, see Appendix B for details.
9last number is probably too high since the ﬁnancial sector is larger than the banking sector and
failures are only part of closings). We ﬁnally pick the value of 1%, that is δ = 99%.14
The aggregate balance sheet of US banks is displayed in Appendix B. It is worth noting that
in balance sheet data, interbank and consumer deposits as well as interbank and ﬁrm loans are
stock variables (as far as we know, no ﬂow data are available). In our model, all these vari-
ables have a one-quarter maturity and we cannot distinguish ﬂows from stocks. We therefore
calibrate the model to keep the same ratio between variables (in the data and in the model),
but keeping in mind that their values have different meanings (stocks in data and ﬂows in the
model). In other words, we impose Dl/Lb = 2 and Dbd/Lb = Dbs/Lb = 0.5.15 Finally, we also
impose a market book for each bank equal to ﬁrm loans: Bl = Bb = Lb. The market book share
seems larger than what observed in data but we must again keep in mind that Lb is a stock in
data and a ﬂow in the model.
According to the Basel agreement, minimum own funds cannot be lower than 8% of risk-
adjusted assets (k = 0.08). The latter are deﬁned by associating a risk category (weight) to
each balance sheet asset (the riskier the assets, the larger the weight). The weight varies from
zero to 150 percent. The interbank market in OECD countries is almost risk-free and a low
weight ( ¯ ¯ ω = 0.05) seems sensible. The weight of the market book must lie between 0.2 (AAA
investments) and 1.5 (riskiest investments) so we choose ˜ ω = 1.2. Finally, we assume that the
Basel weight for loans to private ﬁrms is somewhere in between and set ¯ ω = 0.80. Although
the ofﬁcial minimum ratio is 8%, most banks adopt a higher effective ratio to avoid any penalty
risk and we set this effective ratio at 15%. The whole Basel calibration implies that total own
funds represent 25% of total market book, which is slightly lower than what observed in data
(about 33%, see Appendix B).
Every period, banks allocate 50% of their proﬁts to own funds (υb = υl = 0.50) and the re-
maining 50% are distributed to shareholders. Our model also includes an insurance mecha-
nism. In case of default, 80% of the bad loans are eventually reimbursed by an insurance fund
(ζb = ζl = 0.80). But it implies that banks must put about 6% of their own funds into this
insurance scheme every quarter (ξb = 5.9% and ξl = 6.5%).
From all these restrictions, we are able to infer values for ωb (default cost parameter for banks),
dδ (default disutility parameter for banks), dFb and dFl (own funds utility parameter for respec-
tively borrowing and lending banks). We also get on average (quarterly ﬁgure), that default
costs amount to 0.2% of own funds and that the return on own funds (ratio of proﬁts to own
14In section 4, we compare our simulations to the Z-score series, because the FDIC series is extremely volatile and
the BLS series is limited in time.
15In data, interbank loans do not match interbank deposits because US banks have borrowing/lending relation-
ships with banks abroad. Because we model a close economy, we must force a perfect match between deposits and
loans.
10funds) is 12%. This is probably a too high return but it could be simply decreased by introduc-
ing ﬁxed costs for banks (building, equipment, employment,...).
3.2 Real sector
As usual in RBC models, the consumption utility function U is logarithmic and employment





Douglas with labor share = 2/3, i.e. is 1−  = 2/3, and the productivity shock is normalized to
1 (ǫ = 1). We assume that capital stock is 10 times higher than production and the depreciation
rate of capital is 3%, implying an investment ratio to output of 0.3 (K/F = 10 and τ = 3% gives
τK/F = 0.3). This is higher than what is observed in data and usually used in RBC models
(K/F = 8 and τ = 2.5% gives τK/F = 0.2), but we need this to avoid a negative search cost γ.
The US courts provide quarterly data on business bankruptcies. We divide these data by the
number of ﬁrms to deﬁne the ﬁrm default rate and we obtain 5%. Using the same kind of
data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, we get a similar value. In our calibration, we
therefore set α = 0.95.17 From this, we infer values for γ (ﬁrm default cost parameter), df (ﬁrm
default disutility parameter) and ¯ m (leisure utility parameter). This also implies that default
costs for ﬁrms represent on average 0.6% of output, that ﬁrm proﬁts represent 4% of output
and that consumption represents 70% of output (exactly as in data). Finally, the smoothing
parameter for deposits is set close to 0 (χ = 0.01) to avoid any dynamic effects (see footnote 9).
4 Simulations
In the RBC tradition, we ﬁrst check if the model is able to match some important stylized
facts. Simulations are driven by autoregressive productivity shocks ǫt = (ǫt−1)
ρǫ exp(uǫ
t) with






and σǫ = 0.01 (standard in RBC literature). We assume a constant
return on market book, a Basel I regime (η = 0) and no liquidity interventions (ν = 0). We then
show how important is the ﬁnancial accelerator generated by our endogenous default rates.
Finally, we explain the effects of the Basel I regulation on both the steady state of the economy
and its cyclical properties, and how the latter are affected by moving from Basel I to Basel II
(risk-sensitive capital requirements).
4.1 Business cycle moments
We compute real data ﬁrst and second moments for interest rates, repayment rates, balance
sheet components and production, and we compare these moments to those obtained from
our simulated data. Real moments are reported in columns “data” of Table 3 and simulated
16On average, we work about 20% of total available hours: 0.2 ∼ = (40× 42)/(52× 7× 24).
17In section 4, we compare our simulations to the US courts series, because the BLS series is limited in time.
11moments are reported in columns “model”. The model is calibrated to broadly match ﬁrst





t (stocks vs. ﬂows and open vs. close economy) has already been documented
in section 3.
Regarding the second moments, real data show that all interest rates are volatile, positively
correlated with output and highly persistent.18 Our model does not generate enough volatility
(but we do not have an endogenous policy rate) but reproduces the positive correlation as well
asthepersistenceofthethreeinterestrates. Moreover, thecorrelationbetweenthethreeinterest
rates is high, as in data. We are also able to reproduce the procyclicality of the two repayment
rates, although we do not get enough volatility for αt (in the calibration, we impose a quadratic
cost for default, a less convex cost would ﬁll - very - partially the gap).
In data, balance sheet components are very volatile, mainly procyclical and highly persistent.19
The only two countercyclical variables are interbank loans and consumer deposits. We clearly
cannot reproduce these last two facts. In our model, without liquidity injections, interbank
loans always match interbank deposits. And as in all RBC models, savings are positively cor-
related with output, unless we change households’ preferences. For the other variables, the
model reproduces nicely the volatility and the procyclicality, at the exception of proﬁts and as
a result, own funds. The reason is obvious: all ﬂuctuations in our model are driven by the sole
productivity shock whereas we can expect that other shocks (for instance stock market shocks)
are also important to explain banking sector cyclical properties. Finally, our model ﬁts reason-
ably well data for GDP, consumption, investment and employment. It is worth noting that all
these results directly depend on the model and not on a very speciﬁc calibration.20
Adding a market book shock along to our productivity shock (with a positive correlation be-
tween them) improves the results and provides a much more realistic representation of the
banking sector. More precisely, this increases the volatility and the procyclicality of proﬁts and
own funds; and this reduces the procyclicality of all interest rates and of the loans to ﬁrms.
Results are displayed and explained in detail in Appendix D.
18The positive correlation and the high volatility are due to our time history: monetary policy was very active
from 1985 onwards and the three interest rates we use are highly correlated with the Fed Fund rate. Starting in
1947, as for instance Stock and Watson (1999), would have produced a negative correlation as well as a much lower
volatility.
19The extreme volatility of proﬁts is explained by the stock market crash in October 1987 (Black Monday). As a
result, bank proﬁts felt by about 95% the following quarters.
20For instance, although earlier versions of this paper (see for instance NBB WP 148 or BCL WP 35) are calibrated
on Luxembourg data, results are qualitatively similar.
124.2 On the role of endogenous repayment rates
We ﬁrst explore the effects of endogenous repayment rates from a static analysis. The repay-
ment rate α appears on both sides of the loan market for ﬁrms. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function (see section 3), and posing β = 1 and df = 0 , the demand side of the credit
market represented by ﬁrst order conditions (A2), (A3) and (A4), see Appendix A, simpliﬁes in











where c =   N1− 
τ  is a constant. Equation (16) is the negatively sloped credit demand and
equation (17) indicates that the quadratic penalty costs yield the default rate (1− α) to be de-
creasing with the demand for loans. On the supply side, ﬁrst order condition (A7) simpliﬁes to
(assuming no insurance fund):
1
1+ rb = α −
dFbk ¯ ω
λb , (18)
meaning that the interest rate rb depends negatively on the repayment rate α. The reason is
that banks are in ﬁne not interested in the gross return on loans rb/(1 + rb) but on the net
return which depends positively on the ﬁrm repayment rate. Interest rate and repayment rate
are (imperfect) substitute in the borrowing banks net return. From this we can infer that an
increase in the demand for loans following a positive shock will (i) decrease the ﬁrms default
rate, i.e. the risk incurred by the merchant bank, (ii) which yields a relatively lower price
of loans for ﬁrms and (iii) increases further their loans demand. This typically reproduces
the mechanism of a ﬁnancial accelerator. Would we impose α to be ﬁxed, the substitution
effect in the composition of the borrowing banks net return would disappear, and the ﬁnancial
accelerator would collapse.
The same mechanism can be described on the interbank market (imperfect substitution be-
tween δ and i) and leads to the second accelerator of the model. From this twin mechanism,
we see that the above described model allows for a potential contagion and ampliﬁcation of
banking sector shock to the real activity and vice versa. This conﬁrms alternative approaches
showing the importance of credit market imperfections to accelerate shocks, see for instance
Bernanke et al. (1999) with asymmetry of information and agency costs or Wasmer and Weil
(2004) with sequential search and matching processes.
As an illustration, we conduct two alternative simulations with a positive productivity shock
(TFP shock for the ﬁrm). In the ﬁrst simulation the ﬁrm and bank repayment rates are exoge-
nous and in the second, the ﬁrm and bank repayment rates are endogenous. Figure 2 shows
that the positive shock increases ﬁrm and bank repayment rates which in turn limit the rise
13in rb
t and it, amplifying the productivity shock and stimulating further employment and out-
put.21 Quantitatively, endogenous defaults accelerate employment and output ﬂuctuations by
respectively 10% and 5%.
4.3 The Basel regulation
According to the Basel regulation, banks must hold capital reserves (own funds) appropriate
to the risk the banks expose themselves to through their lending and investment practices. But
concern emerged about the possibility of negative impact that capital requirements could exert
on bank loans and economic activity.22 To answer this question, we check with our model
how capital requirements affect the steady state and the resilience to shocks. More recently,
Basel regulation was modiﬁed to make minimum capital standards more risk-sensitive (the so-
called “Basel II” regulation). Again, concerns have been raised that this new regulation will
exacerbate business cycle ﬂuctuations and we use our model to examine this.23
4.3.1 Own fund requirements: steady state vs. dynamics
In data and in our calibration, the minimum ratio of capital to risk weighted assets is k = 8%.
We instead assume a “Basel-free” economy (k → 0), a “Basel-full” economy (k = 15%) and we
compute the steady state change of moving from Basel-free to Basel-full. Table 4 shows that
stricter capital requirements obviously increases own funds, which in turn reduces the loan
supply (both on the credit market and the interbank market). This raises the two associated
interest rates and these higher credit costs lower repayment rates. In the end, economic activity
shrinks by 0.3%. This is in line with empirical studies although our quantitative results are
relatively low.
If Basel-type regulation is prejudicial to long-run growth, it nevertheless allows to limit busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations. As shown in Figure 3, after a similar productivity shock, ﬂuctuations
are dampened in the Basel-full economy (with respect to the Basel-free economy). Indeed, a
positive productivity shock stimulates loan supply but this increase is limited in case of Basel-
full, because a fraction of it must be kept as own funds. Interest rates are further raised and
this reduces - weakly - employment and GDP ﬂuctuations by respectively 5% and 2%.
21In fact, if the rise in it is well reduced by the lower bank default, there is a second effect playing in opposite
direction. The fall in ﬁrm default and hence in rb
t stimulates credit demand by ﬁrms and banks are forced to ﬁnd
extra liquidities on the interbank market, which increases the interbank rate. In our simulations, the second effect
is higher than the ﬁrst and this explains the fourth plot of Figure 2.
22See for instance Berger and Udell (1994), Brinkmann and Horwitz (1995) or Hancock et al. (1995) for US empir-
ical evidence.
23See for instance Kashyap and Stein (2004) for a discussion and a review of previous works.
144.3.2 From Basel I to Basel II
Let us ﬁrst assess the effects of introducing risk-sensitive capital requirements for the merchant
banksfromasteadystateanalysis. Afteranincreasein α (positiveorprocyclicalshock), thecap-
ital adequacy requirement for the merchant banks remains unchanged under Basel I whereas
capital requirement decreases under Basel II. In other words, a higher α implies ¯ ωII < ¯ ωI. From










λb ( ¯ ωII − ¯ ωI). (19)
It is straightforward that ¯ ωII < ¯ ωI ⇒ rb
II < rb
I, meaning that after a positive shock on α,
the borrowing rate will be lower under a Basel II regulation than under a Basel I regulation.
From the loan demand ﬁrst order condition (18), it also means that Lb and hence GDP and
employment will be further stimulated with a Basel II regulation.24
Would this partial equilibrium result on the procyclicality of Basel II be conﬁrmed in our gen-
eral equilibrium setup? We let ¯ ωt vary negatively with ﬁrms expected repayment rate αt+1 as
displayed on equation (15) with η = 100. This value allows realistic variation of the weight
(10% variation for a 1% GDP ﬂuctuation). Figure 4 shows that, under Basel II, the effect of αt+1
on ¯ ωt acts as an extra positive shock on loans supply, reducing further the borrowing rate rb
t.
From the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition (A3), this enhances the demand for loans which further
stimulates GDP and employment. Our dynamic general equilibrium setup therefore conﬁrms
the procyclical effect, i.e. multiplier effect amplifying the effects of the shock, of Basel II type of
regulations (about a 1% acceleration of GDP ﬂuctuations).
In general, we see that the quantitative effects of the Basel regulation are weak. One reason,
as already underlined by Heid (2007) with a static partial equilibrium model, is that they are
mitigated by the buffer banks hold on top of the required minimum capital.
5 An illustration: the subprime crisis
The subprime mortgage crisis was initially triggered by a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquen-
cies. Banks that had heavily invested in mortgage backed-securities sustained large losses in
their market book, which in turn leaded to a generalized credit tightening. To avoid an even
more severe credit crunch, the Fed ﬂooded the interbank market with liquidities. In this sec-
tion, we use our model to understand how an adverse market book shock may spread to the
whole economy and what are the effects - both in the short- and the long-run - of liquidity in-
jections. To do so, we set the productivity shock to its steady state value but instead introduce









. We set the autoregressive parameter at 0.50 and have normally
distributed innovations with variance 0.01.
5.1 Market book shock and liquidity injections
Figure 5 displays the impulse response function for some variables with ν = 0 (no injections).
The fall in market book return (it amounts to an initial fall in bank total assets of 0.6%) dries
the interbank market and equilibrium is only restored through higher interbank rates (they
increase from 2.8% to 2.9% in annual terms). Loans to ﬁrms also decline by 0.3% and render
capital more expensive for ﬁrms (from 6.6% to 6.7%). Defaults increase for both ﬁrms and
banks, and GDP shrinks by 0.2%. This clearly shows the strong links between the banking sec-
tor and the rest of the economy and is usually referred to as the “credit crunch” story. Liquidity
injections (ν = 50, implying that central bank interventions represent on average 10% of the
interbank market volume) modify the reaction of the economy after this - negative - market
book shock. Initially the central bank favors the borrowing bank, supplying liquidities and
preventing the interbank rate to spike. As a result, it also supports loan supply to ﬁrms Lb
t,
inducing a lower increase in the credit rate and a lower fall in the ﬁrms repayment rate αt. On
the short term, the effects of the market book shock are therefore strongly reduced by liquidity
interventions, with the GDP fall divided by 2.
Beside this impact effect, the central bank intervention has a delayed effect. Money injections
maintain artiﬁcially low interbank loans by lending banks, and this makes the disequilibrium
more persistent. A more persistent disequilibrium means interest rates remain above equilib-
rium for longer, with the consequence that after some periods, the initial economy stabilizing
effect of the injection will turn into a procyclical one. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 5: the
fall in the repayment rate αt is reduced by the central bank intervention in the short run. But
from the moment money supply brings the interbank interest rate above what it would have
been in the absence of intervention, αt is below its no-intervention level. As a result, in the long
run, liquidity interventions increase the persistence of the shock - negative - effects on economic
activity.
5.2 Optimal monetary policy
Since we have positive short-run effects and negative long-run effects, at least for GDP, we
wonder what would be the optimal rule for liquidity injections in case of market book shocks,
that is what would be the optimal ν in:
Mt = ν (it − ¯ i).
16We assume that the central bank may follow two objectives: GDP stability and ﬁnancial stabil-












i.e. the central bank minimizes output ﬂuctuations as in Woodford (2003).25 Alternatively, we











In Figure 6, we plot the values of L
gdp
0 and Lδ
0, obtained by simulating a second order approxi-
mation to the model, for different values of ν. We see that a higher interbank rate stability (that
isahigher ν)increasesﬁnancialstability. Thisresultisintuitivesincethebankdefaultrate1−δt
directly depends on the interbank rate, see equation (A6). The effect of a higher interbank rate
stability on output stability is ambiguous: depending on the importance of the ν parameter,
central bank interventions according to a simpliﬁed McCallum rule may either increase or de-
crease the volatility of the economic activity. Indeed, section 5.1 shows that liquidity injections
stabilize the economy in the short run but not in the long run. The total resulting effect depends
on the relative importance these two opposite forces.26
Finally, moving from a Basel I regime to a Basel II regime helps to reduce further ﬁnancial
instability (the curve moves left) but increases output instability (the curve moves up). This
last result is obvious because of the procyclicality of Basel II, see section 4.3.2 for a discussion.
6 Conclusion
Over the past decade, ﬁnancial stability issues have become an important research ﬁeld for
academicsandaveryvisibleobjectiveforpolicymakersandcentralbanks. Amajorityofcentral
banks and several international ﬁnancial institutions, such as the IMF and the BIS, have begun
publishing regular reports on this ﬁeld. However, most of this research and analysis remain
descriptiveand/orbasedonpartialequilibriumanalysis. Wethinkthataconsistentframework
for ﬁnancial stability analysis must account for all linkages and diffusion processes, not only
between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors, but also within the ﬁnancial sector itself.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (related to the RBC
literature) with an heterogeneous banking sector and endogenous default rates as in Goodhart
25Since we do not have a nominal model, the central bank objective obviously does not include price ﬂuctuations.
26ν = 200 means that on average, central bank interventions represent 40% of the interbank market volume.
Pushing ν above 200 would not stabilize much further GDP or δ (the marginal effect of a higher ν becomes very
weak).
17et al. (2005). We show that this model is promising in reproducing US stylized facts. We also
discuss the role of the Basel regulation as well as the effects of liquitity injections in case of
adverse shocks.
This model is relatively simple and could be extended along several directions. First, we here
only focus on monetary injections, leaving aside the other main central bank policy instrument:
the ﬁxation of the repurchase rate. Proper representation of central bank behavior (auctions at
a central bank determine repo rate and market-determined interbank rate with possibility of -
liquid - central bank interventions) would be interesting although probably not trivial. Second,
we have no nominal dimension in our model. An extension to a New-Keynesian framework
(perfectly competitive ﬁrms need to be replaced by monopolistic wholesalers setting Calvo
prices and selling intermediate goods to perfectly competitive retailers) would make it possible
to study the effects of central bank behavior on inﬂation (and therefore to include inﬂation into
the loss function). We leave these works for future research.
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20A First order conditions
A.1 Firms
The optimization yields the following ﬁrst order conditions, with λt deﬁned as the shadow
value of capital:
ǫtFNt = wt, (A1)
ǫtFKt = λt − Et





















Equation (A1) equalizes the marginal productivity of labor and wages. Equation (A2) deﬁnes
the marginal productivity of capital as its shadow value today minus its discounted shadow
value tomorrow, and equation (A3) says that the shadow value of capital today is equal to its
discounted expected cost (a fraction αt will be paid back tomorrow and a cost on the remaining
fraction will be paid two periods ahead). Equation (A4) equalizes the marginal cost of paying
back today to the discounted marginal search cost of tomorrow plus the marginal disutility
term.
A.2 Merchant banks






























t+1 αt+1 + ζb ˜ βt+2 λb
t+2 (1− αt+1)
 




















The Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (7) is represented by λb
t. Equation (A5)
is the trade off between paying back today and paying a cost tomorrow. Equations (A6)
and (A7) are Euler equations respectively for borrowing (from the interbank market) and lend-
ing (to ﬁrms).
21A.3 Deposit banks

















t+1 δt+1 + ζl ˜ βt+2 λl
t+2 (1− δt+1)
 






















and (A10) are Euler equations for respectively deposits (from households) and loans (to the
interbank market).
A.4 Households






















Equation (A12) is the Euler equation for consumption augmented with the deposit target term
and equation (A13) is the labor supply ﬁrst order condition.
B Real data
B.1 Computation and sources
Real quarterly US data from 1985Q1 to 2008Q2. Nominal data are deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator
(stock and ﬂow data) or the CPI (ﬁnancial data). More precisely:
- Interbank loans: include all loans and advances to credit institutions, Fed funds and RPs
with banks, repayable on demand or with agreed maturity. Data from the quarterly ag-
gregated and seasonally adjusted balance sheet of commercial banks in the United States.
Source: Federal Reserve System statistics.
- Market book: includes treasury and agency securities and other ﬁxed and variables se-
curities. Data from the quarterly aggregated and seasonally adjusted balance sheet of
commercial banks in the United States. Source: Federal Reserve System statistics.
22- Loans to ﬁrms: include commercial and industrial loans and real estate loans for commer-
cial activities. Data from the quarterly aggregated and seasonally adjusted balance sheet
of commercial banks in the United States. Source: Federal Reserve System statistics.
- Others (assets): deﬁned as the difference between total assets and the sum of market
book, interbank loans and loans to ﬁrms.
- Interbank deposits: include all borrowings from banks. Data from the quarterly aggre-
gated and seasonally adjusted balance sheet of commercial banks in the United States.
Source: Federal Reserve System statistics.
- Consumer deposits: include transaction and non-transaction deposits. Data from the
quarterly aggregated and seasonally adjusted balance sheet of commercial banks in the
United States. Source: Federal Reserve System statistics.
- Own funds: deﬁned as subscribed capital plus reserves including past proﬁts bring for-
ward. Because of the lack of data on these components, own funds are approximated by
the gap (residual) between total assets and liabilities. Source: Federal Reserve System
statistics.
- Proﬁts: quadratic interpolation of commercial bank annual proﬁts data, published by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Table CB 04.
- Others (liabilities): data from the quarterly aggregated and seasonally adjusted balance
sheet of commercial banks in the United States. Source: Federal Reserve System statistics.
- Lending rate: quarterly average of monthly interest rates on certiﬁcate deposits (non-
transaction deposits) minus 100 basis points. Source: Federal Reserve System statistics,
series H 15. This adjustment is justiﬁed by the existence of transaction deposits paying
lower interest rates. The size of this adjustment is chosen from the monthly survey of
FRBSF regarding the interest rates on deposits and loans.
- Interbank rate: quarterly average of daily data on London interbank offered rate for US
dollar. Source: Bloomberg, series US0003M.
- Borrowing rate: quarterly average of monthly interest rates on bank prime loans plus 150
basis points. Source: Federal Reserve System statistics, series H 15. This adjustment is
justiﬁed by the existence of borrowers riskier than prime ones. The size of this adjustment
is chosen from the monthly survey of FRBSF regarding the interest rates on deposits and
loans.
- Default rate for banks (Z-score, see Appendix C for details): calculated from aggregated
and seasonally adjusted balance sheet of commercial banks in the United States (Federal
Reserve System) and interpolated annual proﬁt (FDIC).
23- Defaultrateforbanks(BLS):quarterlyandseasonallyadjustednumberofclosings(source:
BLS, series ﬁnancial activities, 1992-2008) divided by the number of ﬁnancial institutions
(quadratic interpolation of yearly data, source: US courts).
- Default rate for banks (FDIC): own computation of quarterly and seasonally adjusted
number of commercial bank failures (based on declared date of bank failure, seasonally
adjusted with Census X12, source: FDIC) divided by the number of commercial banks
(quadratic interpolation of yearly data, source: FDIC).
- Default rate for ﬁrms (US courts): ratio of the quarterly number companies failure (sea-
sonallyadjustedwithCensusX12, source: UScourts)tothetotalnumberofﬁrms(quadratic
interpolation of yearly data, source: US courts).
- Defaultrateforﬁrms(BLS):quarterlyandseasonallyadjustednumberofclosings(source:
BLS,seriestotalprivateindustry, 1992-2008)dividedbythetotalnumberofﬁrms(quadratic
interpolation of yearly data, source: US courts).
- Default rate for ﬁrms (bad loans): ratio of commercial loan charge-off for all banks to
total of commercial loans. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, seasonally adjusted
quarterly data.
- Investment: seasonally adjusted quarterly real private ﬁxed investment. Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
- Consumption: seasonally adjusted quarterly real private consumption. Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
- GrossDomesticProduct: seasonallyadjustedquarterlyrealgrossdomesticproduct. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
- Employment: quarterly employment in the non farm business sector. Source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
B.2 Banks balance sheet
Figure7depictsanaggregatebalancesheetfortheUSbankingsector(average1985Q1-2008Q2).
B.3 Link between sectors: further empirical evidence
How far ﬁrm investment is dependant from the banking sector credit? Because we do not
have data on new loans to ﬁrms (ﬂow), we compare investment to the stock of existing loans.
24Figure 8 shows that the two series have a similar volatility and are closely related, suggesting
a close tie between ﬁrms and banks.27
In section 3.2, we deﬁne the ﬁrm default rate by the ratio of bankruptcies to the total number
of ﬁrms. The Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis provides data on bad loans (that we divide
by the total amount of commercial loans) and we obtain an average of 0.5%, i.e. a much lower
number than the 5% we obtain from bankruptcy data. However, as shown in Figure 9, it is
interesting to see that these two series are closely related, suggesting again a close link between
sectors.
C Z-score: an application to US bank default
The Z-score index is a distance to default indicator (DD) calculated from bank’s balance sheet
andproﬁtaccount (ratherthan anoption-basedmeasureasthestandardDDindicator). Thead-
vantage of the Z-score (book value) relative to DD (market value) is the possibility to evaluate
the default risk of non listed companies.
The Z-score is deﬁned as z = (  + k)/σ , where   is the average return on assets (ROA), k is
the ratio of own funds to total assets, and σ is the ROA standard deviation. In other words, the
Z-score measures the number of standard deviations a return realization would have to fall in
order to deplete banks’ own funds, under the assumption of normality of returns. As with DD,
the higher level of the Z-score the better is quality of the bank and the lower is the probability
of insolvency.
In this paper, we derived the Z-score for the US aggregated banking sector from quarterly
ﬁnancial statements. The sample period covers 1985Q1 to 2008Q2. We adopt the Maechler
et al. (2007) approach and use a eight-quarter rolling Z-index calculated from the 8 quarters
moving average of the three above mentioned variables. We then take the logarithm of the
result to get z.
As the Z-score is, by assumption, normally distributed with a mean zero and a standard devi-
ation equal 1, the probability of default of the banking sector at time t is Pt = F(−zt), where F
is the cumulative distribution.
27We start in 1988 because of a structural break in the credit series (commercial real estate was not included before
1988). We also see that the credit series lags the investment series. One possible explanation is that investment is a
ﬂow whereas credit is a stock.
25D Businesscyclemomentswithproductivityandmarketbookshocks
We keepthe productivityshock detailedin section4, but wenow alsoadda marketbookshock.








. We set the autoregressive parameter at
0.50, the innovations are normally distributed and the variance is chosen such that 25% of GDP
ﬂuctuations are explained by the market book shock (that is the remaining 75% are explained
by the productivity shock). We also assume that productivity and market book innovations
have a 65% correlation. New moments are displayed in Table 5.
Adding a positive market book shock increases proﬁts and hence own funds, and the negative
effect due to the productivity shock is more than offset. It also raises the volatility of proﬁts
and own funds. This improves the statistical properties of the model. The market book shock
also affects the behaviour of interest rates. A productivity shock increases capital demand
and hence interest rates (procyclical interest rates). On the other hand, a market book shock
increases capital supply and hence decreases interest rates (countercyclical interest rates). This
explains why adding a market book shock to a productivity shock reduces the procyclicality
of interest rates. This reduction goes in the right direction (w.r.t. data) although the effect is
too strong. Finally, although both shocks stimulate loans to ﬁrms, the loans procyclicality is
reduced (and almost matches data perfectly). Indeed, with a single productivity shock, the
persistence of loans and GDP is the same. Adding the second shock (less persistent than the
ﬁrst one) reduces the loans persistence further than the GDP persistence and explains the lower
procyclicality. Globally, adding a market book shock strongly improves the second moments
of the banking sector and underlines the - obvious - fact that a productivity shock alone is
not sufﬁcient to reproduce business cycle properties of the banking sector. It is worth noting
that despite the market book shock, we still assume an exogenous and constant market book
volume. Fully endogenous market book behaviour could be an interesting extension to even
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Figure 1: Flows between agents



































Figure 2: Endogenous repayment rates and size of the ﬁnancial accelerator
27Banks
k = 0.08 ¯ ω = 0.8 ¯ ¯ ω = 0.05 ˜ ω = 1.20
dδ = 6.67 ωb = 679 ¯ Bb = 0.19 ¯ Bl = 0.19
dFb = 6.71 ζb = 0.8 ξb = 0.06 υb = 0.5
dFl = 53.4 ζl = 0.8 ξl = 0.07 υl = 0.5
Firms
df = 0.05 γ = 75.4   = 0.333 τ = 0.03
Households
β = 0.996 ¯ m = 3.72 ¯ Dl = 0.39 χ = 0.01
k = minimum own funds ratio, ¯ ω = Basel weight for loans to ﬁrms, ¯ ¯ ω = Basel weight for interbank loans, ˜ ω = Basel weight for
market book, dδ = bank default disutility, ωb = bank default cost, ¯ Bx = market book volume for bank x ∈ {b,l}, dFx = own funds
utility for bank x ∈ {b,l}, ζx = insurance coverage on defaulted amount for bank x ∈ {b,l}, ξx = own funds share devoted to the
insurance fund for bank x ∈ {b,l}, υx = proﬁt share devoted to own funds for bank x ∈ {b,l}, df = ﬁrm default disutility, γ = ﬁrm
default cost,   = capital share, τ = capital depreciation rate, β = discount factor, ¯ m = leisure utility, ¯ Dl = deposit target, χ = deposit
gap disutility.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
Interest and repayment rates
rl = 0.35% i = 0.7% rb = 1.6% δ = 0.99 α = 0.95
Assets and liabilities
Dl
Lb = 2 Db
Lb = 0.5 Bb
Lb = 1 F
B = 0.25 Bl
Bb = 1
Production, penalty costs and proﬁts
K
F = 10 πf
F = 4%
tpcf
F = 0.6% τK
F = 0.3% C
F = 0.7




rb : borrowing rate, i : interbank rate, rl : deposit rate, α : ﬁrm repayment rate, δ : bank repayment rate, Lb : loans to ﬁrms, Db :
interbank volume, Dl : consumer deposits, Bx = market book volume for bank x ∈ {b,l}, πf = ﬁrm proﬁt, K = capital stock, τK =










, π = total proﬁts for banks = πb + πl, F = total own funds = Fb + Fl, B =
total market book = Bb + Bl.
Table 2: Implied values for variables
28relative correlation ﬁrst-order
mean standard deviation with output autocorrelation
data model data model data model data model
rb
t 6.61 6.49 1.20 0.16 0.36 0.95 0.90 0.71
it 2.80 2.82 1.20 0.10 0.49 0.94 0.88 0.70
rl
t 1.70 1.41 1.20 0.12 0.47 0.95 0.88 0.70
αt 95.4 95.0 0.52 0.09 0.44 0.73 0.82 0.70
δt 99.9 99.0 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.71 0.87 0.68
Lb
t(∗) 0.67 0.29 4.03 2.94 0.36 0.99 0.79 0.71
Dbd
t (∗) 0.49 0.15 6.95 6.18 0.44 0.97 0.87 0.71
Dbs
t (∗) 0.11 0.15 8.21 6.18 -0.24 0.97 0.81 0.71
Dl
t(∗) 1.59 0.60 1.38 1.45 -0.11 0.99 0.87 0.71
Ft 0.22 0.15 4.62 0.05 0.01 -0.70 0.64 0.96
πt 0.01 0.02 47.3 0.24 0.13 -0.84 0.78 0.73
gdpt 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.72
Ct 0.69 0.70 0.82 0.36 0.81 0.93 0.83 0.79
invt 0.20 0.29 4.00 2.94 0.89 0.99 0.92 0.71
Nt 0.20 0.20 1.03 0.61 0.77 0.98 0.96 0.70
All variables have been logged with the exception of the real interest rates and default rates. Interest rates are annualized. Real
data: see Appendix B. rb
t : borrowing rate, it : interbank rate, rl
t : deposit rate, αt : ﬁrm repayment rate, δt : bank repayment
rate, Lb
t : loans to ﬁrms, Dbd
t : interbank deposits, Dbs
t : interbank loans, Dl
t : consumer deposits, Ft = Fb
t + Fl
t : bank own funds,
πt = πb
t + πl
t : bank proﬁts, gdpt = Ct + Kt − (1 − τ)Kt−1 + Fb
t + Fl
t − (1 − ξb)Fb
t−1 − (1 − ξl)Fl
t−1 : gross domestic product, Ct :
consumption, invt = Kt − (1 − τ)Kt−1 : investment, Nt : employment. Variables marked with (*) are stocks in data but ﬂows in
our model (because they all have one-period maturity) and we must remain cautious when comparing (especially steady states).
Table 3: Cyclical properties
F = +7% π = -0.3% gdp = -0.3%
Lb = -0.3% α = -0.1 rb = +0.4
Dbs = -51% δ = -0.3 i = +0.3
F = Fb + Fl : bank own funds, π = πb + πl : bank proﬁts, gdp = C + τK + +ξbFb + ξlFl : gross domestic product, rb : borrowing
rate, i : interbank rate, α : ﬁrm repayment rate, δ : bank repayment rate, Lb : loans to ﬁrms, Dbs : interbank loans.
Table 4: Steady state effects of increasing the minimum own funds ratio from k = 0% to k =
15%

































Figure 3: Dynamic effects of minimum own funds ratio



































Figure 4: Procyclical effects of Basel II



















































Figure 5: Market book shock and liquidity injections










































Figure 7: Aggregate balance sheet of US banks (average 1985Q1-2008Q2)














Figure 8: Bank loans to ﬁrms (credit) vs. ﬁrm investment (deviations from trend)
32relative correlation ﬁrst-order
mean standard deviation with output autocorrelation
data model data model data model data model
rb
t 6.61 6.49 1.20 0.12 0.36 0.17 0.90 0.64
it 2.80 2.82 1.20 0.10 0.49 0.08 0.88 0.49
rl
t 1.70 1.41 1.20 0.10 0.47 0.26 0.88 0.56
αt 95.4 95.0 0.52 0.10 0.44 0.66 0.82 0.58
δt 99.9 99.0 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.65 0.87 0.61
Lb
t(∗) 0.67 0.29 4.03 3.32 0.36 0.38 0.79 0.58
Dbd
t (∗) 0.49 0.15 6.95 5.84 0.44 0.75 0.87 0.59
Dbs
t (∗) 0.11 0.15 8.21 5.84 -0.24 0.75 0.81 0.59
Dl
t(∗) 1.59 0.60 1.38 1.72 -0.11 0.32 0.87 0.76
Ft 0.22 0.15 4.62 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.64 0.96
πt 0.01 0.02 47.3 1.14 0.13 0.64 0.78 0.73
gdpt 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.65
Ct 0.69 0.70 0.82 0.35 0.81 0.93 0.83 0.73
invt 0.20 0.29 4.00 3.32 0.89 0.98 0.92 0.58
Nt 0.20 0.20 1.03 0.48 0.77 0.92 0.96 0.75
All variables have been logged with the exception of the real interest rates and default rates. Interest rates are annualized. Real
data: see Appendix B. rb
t : borrowing rate, it : interbank rate, rl
t : deposit rate, αt : ﬁrm repayment rate, δt : bank repayment
rate, Lb
t : loans to ﬁrms, Dbd
t : interbank deposits, Dbs
t : interbank loans, Dl
t : consumer deposits, Ft = Fb
t + Fl
t : bank own funds,
πt = πb
t + πl
t : bank proﬁts, gdpt = Ct + Kt − (1 − τ)Kt−1 + Fb
t + Fl
t − (1 − ξb)Fb
t−1 − (1 − ξl)Fl
t−1 : gross domestic product, Ct :
consumption, invt = Kt − (1 − τ)Kt−1 : investment, Nt : employment. Variables marked with (*) are stocks in data but ﬂows in
our model (because they all have one-period maturity) and we must remain cautious when comparing (especially steady states).
Table 5: Cyclical properties with two shocks
















US courts (lhs) bad loans (rhs)
Figure 9: Firm default: bankruptcies (US courts) vs. bad loans (deviations from trend)
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